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Bankruptcy
by Hon. John T. Laney, II
and Daniel Taylor*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on bankruptcy opinions issued in 2013 by the
Supreme Court of the United States and courts within the Eleventh
Circuit.' The topics range from the legality of "ghostwriting" to the
definition of "defalcation" under section 523(a)(4) of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.
II.

PROFESSIONALS

The case of Torrens v. Hood (In re Hood)' presented the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit with an issue of first
impression.' The issue before the court was one of attorney "ghostwriting."' Ghostwriting simply means "the undisclosed assistance of counsel
in the drafting of a pro se document filed with the court."
The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that a bankruptcy court abused its discretion by

* Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer
University (A.B., 1964); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1966).
Co-Editor in Chief, Mercer Law Review (1965-1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable John T. Laney, III. Auburn University (B.S., 2007);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2013). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of bankruptcy law during the prior survey period, see Hon. James
D. Walker, Jr., Amber Nickell & Tim Colletti, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 64
MERCER L. REv. 849 (2013).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). All statutory references hereinafter (not otherwise
notated) are to Title 11 of the United States Code, which is referred to as "the Bankruptcy
Code."
3. 727 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2013).
4. Id. at 1364.
5. Id. at 1363.
6. Id. at 1364.
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sanctioning two attorneys for committing a fraud upon the court by
ghostwriting a debtor's Chapter 13 petition.' The court, applying
Florida law,' held that filling in a pro se debtor's answers on a standard
Chapter 13 petition was not ghostwriting under Florida's Rules of
Professional Conduct.? As a result, the attorney that assisted with the
preparation of the petition was not required to disclose his assistance to
the court and did not commit a fraud upon the court by failing to do
so.1 0

Hood, the debtor, initially met with his attorney, Adrian Reyes, on
January 24, 2012, to discuss foreclosure defense and possible bankruptcy
representation. Hood informed Reyes that his business assets were due
to be sold at a foreclosure sale scheduled for February 22, 2012. Hood
did not engage Reyes's services at the January 24, 2012 meeting.
However, the day before the scheduled foreclosure sale, Hood again met
with Reyes and, this time, engaged Reyes to provide foreclosure defense
services. He paid Reyes a $1000 retainer. Later that same day, a
courier filed a pro se Chapter 13 petition on the debtor's behalf. One
week after the petition was filed, one of Hood's clients expressed his
concern about the effect Hood's financial circumstances may have on his
ability to continue performing work for him. Hood denied any knowl-

7. Id. at 1365.
8. Florida Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to this case are Rule 4-3.3(a)(1)
("[a] lawyer shall not ... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal") and Rule 48.4(c) ("[a lawyer] shall not ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation"). FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.3(a)(1), -8.4(c) (West 2014).
9. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1365. The Eleventh Circuit expressly limited its decision
to the facts before it in In re Hood. Id. at 1364. The court, however, noted that there is
a split among the circuits in regard to "ghostwriting." Id. at 1364 & n.5. In a footnote, the
court pointed out that the First and Tenth Circuits require attorney disclosure, while the
Second Circuit permits non-disclosure in limited circumstances. Id. (comparingDuran v.
Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (stating that "any ghostwriting
of an otherwise pro se brief must be acknowledged by the signature of the attorney
involved"), and Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (requiring that "[ilf a
brief is prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it must be signed by
him"), with In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 373, app. 3, 381 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(concluding that ghostwriting "largely non-substantive" petitions for administrative cases
"did not constitute misconduct and therefore [did] not warrant the imposition of discipline")).
10. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1365. Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.2 requires
that an attorney assisting a pro se litigant by drafting a pro se document is not required
to sign the document but must identify the document as being prepared with the assistance
of counsel. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.2 (West 2014).
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edge of the bankruptcy and brought a motion for an order to show cause
against Reyes, Luis Torrens, and the Torrens Law Firm, LLC.n
At the evidentiary hearing, Hood asserted that he had no knowledge
of the bankruptcy fling. However, the bankruptcy court found that
Hood had knowledge of the bankruptcy filing because he had signed
several documents that contained the word "bankruptcy" in multiple
places. Reyes maintained that the firm's secretary merely acted as a
scrivener when she filled out the Chapter 13 petition at Hood's request
using answers that Hood provided.' 2
Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.2" does not require an
attorney assisting a pro se litigant "by drafting" a pro se document to
sign the document; however, such attorney must identify the document
as being prepared with the assistance of counsel." The court explained
that filling in a Chapter 13 petition with answers provided by the debtor
is not "drafting" within the meaning of Rule 4-1.2.15 Unlike a legal
brief, which counsel or a pro se debtor must prepare from scratch, a
Chapter 13 petition is a publicly available "fill-in-the-blank" form that
is designed to be used by a pro se debtor.'" The court reasoned that
Hood could have completed the form himself and likely achieved the
same result.'
Furthermore, none of the information placed on the
petition was false.'" Accordingly, the court concluded that Reyes did
not draft a document within the scope of Rule 4-1.2(c) and therefore did
not commit a fraud upon the court in violation of the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct by failing to disclose his assistance. 9
Although other circuits have addressed the issue of ghostwriting,2 0
In re Hood represented the first time the Eleventh Circuit had addressed
the propriety of ghostwriting.2 1 In its decision, the court was careful

11. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1362. Luis Torrens was a partner in the Torrens Law Firm
where Reyes was employed. Id.
12. Id. at 1362, 1363. Reyes, Torrens, and the Torrens Law Firm, all adopted the same
assertions. Id. at 1361.
13.

FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.2 (West 2014).

14. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1363-64. Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.2(c)
reflects Florida's stance on ghostwriting. Id. (citing FIA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 41.2(c)).
15. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1364.
16. Id.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.

19. Id.
20. See, e.g., In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2011); Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268
(10th Cir. 2001); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1971).
21. In re Hood, 727 F.3d at 1364.
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to limit its holding to the specific facts before it.2 2 Therefore, it is
difficult to predict what effect In re Hood will have on future cases of
ghostwriting. However, the reasoning ofIn re Hood would seem to apply
to other instances of attorney assistance. After In re Hood, ghostwriting
may be permissible in instances where an attorney acts merely as a
scrivener by completing or creating a document that a pro se litigant
could have easily completed without assistance and likely accomplished
the same result.
III.

DIS1vIISSAL

A.

Section 707(a) "ForCause"
Under § 707(a)," a bankruptcy court in the Eleventh Circuit may
dismiss a Chapter 7 case based on the debtor's prepetition bad faith."'
Section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy judge to
dismiss a case "for cause," after notice and a hearing. In the case of
Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza),26
the debtor appealed the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida's order affirming the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Florida's dismissal of his Chapter 7 petition
for bad faith under § 707(a). In re Piazza presented the court with a
question of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: whether prepetition
bad faith on the part of the debtor is grounds for involuntary dismissal
under § 707(a) "for cause."28 The court concluded it was.29
In In re Piazza, the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection seeking to
discharge debts he identified as primarily business debts. Piazza's
schedules showed more than half of his approximately $319,683
unsecured debt was owed to a single creditor, Nueterra Healthcare
Physical Therapy, LLC (Nueterra). The debt to Nueterra arose out of a
state court judgment entered against Piazza for failure to pay a business
guarantee. Frustrated by Piazza's resistance to paying the judgment,

22. Id. (citations omitted) ("We first note that while this court has not addressed the
propriety of ghostwriting, we do so today only as ghostwriting applies to the factual
circumstances of the present case.").
23. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012).
24. Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253
(11th Cir. 2013).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
26. 719 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2013).
27. Id. at 1258.
28. Id. at 1260-61.
29. Id.
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the state court ordered him to produce documents justifying his failure
to pay or face adverse presumptions at subsequent hearings. In the face
of this ultimatum, Piazza filed bankruptcy."o
In response to Piazza's petition, Nueterra, the judgment creditor,
argued that based on the "totality of the circumstances," Piazza's
Chapter 7 petition should be dismissed. The bankruptcy court
agreed." The bankruptcy court noted that although Nueterra's motion
relied primarily on § 707(b), 2 Nueterra's "totality of the circumstances
argument" implicitly asked the court to dismiss the case "for cause"
under § 707(a).33 To that end, the bankruptcy court determined that
Piazza had filed his petition in bad faith in an attempt to avoid
Nueterra's collection of the state court judgment. The bankruptcy court
also pointed out that while dodging collection of the state court
judgment, Piazza was able to transfer a significant amount of money to
his wife and pay his great aunt's mortgage. Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court dismissed the case for cause."
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court's holding."
Looking first at the text of the statute, the court noted that "for cause"
is not specifically defined in the code." The court also explained that
the three enumerated examples in § 707(a) were merely illustrative, not
exhaustive.
Accordingly, the court concluded that "based on the
ordinary meaning of the statutory language and relevant principles of
statutory construction, the power to dismiss 'for cause' in § 707(a)
includes the power to involuntarily dismiss a Chapter 7 case based on
prepetition bad faith."
Furthermore, the court held that a totality-of-the-circumstances test
is the correct legal standard for determining bad faith under § 707(a).

30. Id. at 1258.
31. Id. at 1258-59.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) ("[The court .. . may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor's
consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that
the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter.").
33. In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1259.
34. Id. at 1260.
35. Id. at 1260-61.
36. Id. at 1261.
37. Id. Under § 707(a), "[tlhe court may dismiss a case ... for cause, including (1)
unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;" (2) nonpayment of any
required fees or charges; and (3) on motion of the trustee failure to file, within fifteen days
or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition, the
information required in paragraph (1) of § 521(a). 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
38. In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1260-61.
39. Id. at 1272.
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Applying such a test, the court held that the bankruptcy court was
correct in its dismissal of Piazza's Chapter 7 petition.4 0 To further
support its determination that prepetition bad faith is grounds for
dismissal under § 707(a), the court noted that its ruling was consistent
with the Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 dismissal
provisions, which include bad faith or a lack of good faith as grounds for
dismissal.'

B. Abuse
Last year's article discussed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Witcher
v. Witcher (In Re Witcher),"' which held that a court may consider the
debtor's ability to pay debts under the totality-of-the-circumstances test

of § 707(bX3).43 In Kulakowski v. Walton (In re Kulakowski)," the
Eleventh Circuit again dealt with a § 707(bX3) issue.4" The issue
before the court was whether a bankruptcy court may consider the
amount a non-filing spouse contributes to a debtor's household expenses
when determining whether the debtor's Chapter 7 case was abusive
under the § 707(b) totality-of-the-circumstances test."
In In re
Kulakowski, the debtor sought to discharge her debts under Chapter 7,
and the trustee moved to dismiss the case, citing abuse." The United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with
the trustee and dismissed the debtor's Chapter 7 case. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida affirmed."
The debtor and her husband had been married for over twenty years.
During this time the couple operated as a single economic unit by
maintaining a joint checking account, filing joint tax returns, and
pooling their income and expenses. At the time of filing, Mrs. Kulakowski, the debtor, did not have any monthly income. However, Mr.
Kulakowski deposited all of his monthly income into the couple's joint
account. Mr. Kulakowski's monthly take-home pay exceeded the
monthly household expenses by roughly $1100. All household expenses
were paid through the joint account. Although the Kulakowskis
operated as an economic unit for over twenty years, they did not do so
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1265; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), 1307(c) (2012).
42. 702 F.3d 619 (11th Cir. 2012).
43. Id. at 620.
44. 735 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2013).
45. Id. at 1298.
46. Id.
47. Id. The trustee's motion relied on 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(1) and 707(b)(3XB). 735 F.3d
at 1298.
48. 735 F.3d at 1298.
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for the purposes of the Chapter 7 petition, which Mrs. Kulakowski chose
to file individually. Notably, the bankruptcy court found that a
"substantial portion" of the debt that Mrs. Kulakowski sought to
discharge was incurred for the benefit of the household and Mr.
Kulakowski."
Section 707(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court
to "dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under [Chapter 7] whose
debts are primarily consumer debts ... if it finds that the granting of
relief would be an abuse."50 In making a § 707(b)(1) determination,
§ 707(b)(3)(B) states that a bankruptcy court may consider whether "the
totality of the circumstances .'. . of the debtor's financial situation

demonstrates abuse."5 On appeal, the debtor argued that the bankruptcy court erred when it considered the entirety of her non-filing
spouse's income in its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.52 Relying
on § 101(10A)," Mrs. Kulakowski argued that the bankruptcy court
should have only considered the portion of Mr. Kulakowski's income that
was contributed for her household expenses."
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, explaining that "[flew if any tests are
as open-ended as the totality of the circumstances," and that the
inherent flexibility of such a test allows a bankruptcy court to take into
account the debtor's entire financial situation when making its
determination." The court held that when the facts were viewed
together, under the broad totality-of-the-circumstances framework, the
bankruptcy court was correct in its dismissal of Mrs. Kulakowski's
Chapter 7 petition." The court, however, emphasized that its holding
in In re Kulakowski was limited to the specific set of facts before the
court." It declined to opine as to how much weight, if any, a nondebtor spouse's income should factor into a bankruptcy court's analysis
under § 707(b)(3)(B)."

49. Id.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
51. See id. § 707(b)(3)(B).
52. In re Kulakowski, 735 F.3d at 1298.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) (2012). Section 101(10A)(B) defines the "current monthly
income" of the debtor to include "any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor ...
on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor." Id.
54. In re Kulakowski, 735 F.3d at 1300.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1301.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1301-02.
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IV. DISCHARGE

A.

Defalcation

In its only bankruptcy case this year, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A," considered an exception
to discharge under § 523(a)(4), which excepts from discharge those debts
arising from the debtor's "fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."o In a unanimous decision, the
Court resolved a split among the circuits concerning the mental state
that is required to accompany "defalcation" under § 523(aX4). 6' The
term "defalcation" is not specifically defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
Even though "defalcation" has been included as an exception to
discharge since the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,63 courts have been split as
to its meaning.6" In Bullock, the Supreme Court provided clarification,
holding that the scope of the term "includes a culpable state of mind
requirement ... involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect
to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior."6
The debtor in Bullock was the trustee of his father's trust. The trust
had a single asset-an insurance policy on the father's life. The trust
instrument allowed the trustee to borrow funds from the insurer against
the policy's value. In 1981, the debtor, at the request of his father,
borrowed money from the trust. The debtor paid the funds to his
mother, who used the funds to repay a debt to the father's business. In
1984, the debtor again borrowed funds from the trust. However, this
time he used the funds to purchase certificates of deposit, which he and
his mother used to purchase a mill. In 1990, the debtor once again
borrowed from the trust. This time the money was used to buy real

133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).
11 U.S.C. § 523(aX4).
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757, 1759.
See id. at 1758-59.
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
Compare Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1166
(11th Cir. 2013) ("[Diefalcation requires a known breach of a fiduciary duty, such that the
conduct can be characterized as objectively reckless."), and Republic of Rwanda v.
Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that defalcation
occurs when "negligence or even an innocent mistake ... results in misappropriation"),
with Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that
"defalcation" includes "even innocent acts of failure to fully account for money received in
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

trust").
65. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
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property for himself and his mother. The debtor repaid all of the
borrowed funds to the trust along with 6% interest.66
In 1999, the debtor's brother sued him in Illinois state court alleging
the debtor violated his fiduciary duties owed to the trust beneficiaries.
The state court found that the debtor had committed a breach of
fiduciary duty. The court explained that although the debtor did not
"appear to have had a malicious motive in borrowing funds from the
trust" he was "clearly involved in self-dealing.6 7 The court ordered the
debtor to disgorge any profits made from the loan transactions and
imposed a constructive trust on the debtor's interests in the mill and the
original trust. The court also appointed BankChampaign to serve as
trustee for the trust. Because of the constructive trust, the debtor was
unable to liquidate his interest in the mill and other constructive trust
assets to obtain funds to make the court-ordered payment. In an
attempt to discharge his obligation to the trust, the debtor sought
bankruptcy protection."
BankChampaign opposed the debtor's efforts to obtain a discharge of
his debts to the trust. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of the
bank. The court held that the debts fell within § 523(a)(4)'s exception
to discharge "as a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity" and were therefore non-dischargeable.69 The debtor appealed
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The debtor next
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which upheld the district court's
ruling."o The Eleventh Circuit held that "defalcation requires a known
breach of a fiduciary duty, such that the conduct can be characterized as
objectively reckless," and that the debtor's conduct met this standard."
In a previous interpretation of the related term "fraud," in the portion
of the Bankruptcy Act setting out exceptions to discharge, the Supreme
Court found that "'fraud referred to in [this] section means positive
fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong,
as does embezzlement; and not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which

66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 45a, 52a, Bullock v. BankChampaign,
NA., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (No. 11-1518)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting BankChampaign, N.A. v. Bullock (In re Bullock), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS
1783 at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2010)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1166. For a more in-depth analysis of the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling, see Walker et al., supra note 1, at 849.
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may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.' 7 2
Relying on its previous ruling in Neal v. Clarkn the Court concluded
that the term defalcation should be treated similarly.74 With that
standard in mind, the Court concluded that the term "defalcation"
included a state of mind equivalent to the definition in the Model Penal
Code" of reckless conduct. With its holding in Bullock, the Supreme
Court has reconciled the split of authority in the lower courts and
provided a uniform interpretation of defalcation for purposes of
§ 523(a)(4). 7
B.

Statement Respecting the Debtor's FinancialCondition
Another exception to discharge was addressed in the case of Lamar,
Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling (In re Appling)." In In re Appling,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia was faced with
an objection to discharge based on § 523(a)(2)(A).79 The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(bX6)so and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
7012,8' for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2
The plaintiff, a law firm, had represented the debtor and the debtor's
company, Hartwell Enterprises, Inc. (Hartwell), in litigation in the
Superior Court of Franklin County, Georgia. In March 2005, the debtor
and Hartwell owed the plaintiff $66,710.57 in unpaid legal fees. The
plaintiff advised the debtor that unless the legal fees were brought
current, the plaintiff would have to withdraw from any further

72. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759 (quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)).
73. 95 U.S. 704 (1878).
74. Id.
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (Official Draft 1962).
76. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759. Under the Model Penal Code, "recklessness" is defined
as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

§ 2.02(c).

Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761.
500 B.R. 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013).
Id. at 248.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6) (2014).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012 (2014).
In re Appling, 500 B.R. at 248.
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representation. In response, the debtor represented to the plaintiff that
he was due to receive a tax refund in excess of $100,000 and that he
would use the refund to pay the legal fees if the plaintiff would agree to
forego immediate collection and continue representing debtor and
Hartwell in the state-court litigation. In reliance on this promise, the
plaintiff continued with the representation and successfully settled the
litigation in March 2006. Nevertheless, the debtor did not pay the legal
fees. Instead, he used the tax refund to pay the general operating
expenses of Hartwell.'
Section 523(aX2XA) provides an exception to discharge when a
plaintiff's claim arises as a result of the debtor's "false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition."' In contrast, § 523(a)(2XB)
provides an exception to discharge for a false statement concerning the
debtor's or an insider's financial position, provided that such a statement
is in writing." The debtor argued that its oral representation concerning the payment of the legal fees using the funds from the tax refund
was a "statement . . . respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial

condition." Therefore, § 523(a)(2)(B), which requires the statement to be
in writing, rather than § 523(aX2)(A), applied.'
Conversely, the
plaintiff argued that the debtor's representations were not a "statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition." Therefore,
§ 523(a)(2)(A) applied."
Dischargeability exceptions for debts under §§ 523(a)(2XA) and
(aX2XB) are mutually exclusive." This means that any statement
respecting a debtor's or an insider's financial condition, whether written
or oral, is expressly excluded from subsection (A).8 Instead, such a
creditor must assert a claim under subsection (B) and prove that the
statement of financial condition was in writing.90
Accordingly, the primary issue before the court was whether the
debtor's representations were a "statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition" within the meaning of § 523(aX2XA)'s
exception to discharge.9 ' The court decided the debtor's statements

83. Id. By March 2006, the plaintiffs legal fees had grown to over $100,000. Id.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2XA).

85. See id. § 523(aX2XB).
86. In re Appling, 500 B.R. at 249-50 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XB)).

87. Id. at 249 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA)).
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249-50 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2)(A)).
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were not." In its decision, the court explained that the circuit courts
are split on the proper interpretation of the phrase "respecting the
debtor's .. . financial condition."93 One view is the "broad interpreta-

tion," which includes any communication that addresses the status of
any portion of the debtor's financial condition.94 On the other hand, the
"strict interpretation" limits the exception "to communications that
purport to state the debtor's overall net worth, overall financial health,
or equation of assets and liabilities."' The Eleventh Circuit has not
addressed the issue, but the bankruptcy court in In re Appling agreed
with those courts adopting the strict interpretation."
The court found that the debtor's representations were not as to the
debtor's overall financial condition or net worth because the representations concerned a single asset-the tax refund-that would be used to
pay the plaintiffs legal fees." As a result, the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim.98
C. Exception to Discharge Under § 523(a)(7)
Under § 523(a), certain debts are excepted from discharge.99 Among
those listed in § 523(a) is any debt "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit which is not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty."' 00
"Section 523(aX7) applies both to civil and criminal penalties."10 ' The
case of DisciplinaryBoard v. Feingold (In re Feingold)102 presented the
Eleventh Circuit with the question of whether § 523(a)(7) applied to
costs and expenses assessed against an attorney in a disciplinary
proceeding brought against the attorney by a state disciplinary board.103

92. Id. at 251.
93. Id. at 250 (quoting Prim Capital Corp. v. May (In re May), 368 B.R. 85, 2007
Bankr. LEXIS 2335, at *16 (BAP. 6th Cir. July 19, 2007)).
94. Id.; see also Engler v. Van Steinburg (In re Van Steinburg), 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir.
1984) (following the broad interpretation).
95. In re Appling, 500 B.R. at 250 (quoting In re May, 368 B.R. 85,2007 Bankr. LEXIS
2335, at *17); see also Bandi v. Becnel (In re Bandi), 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012); Cadwell
v. Joelson (In re Joelson), 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005).
96. In re Appling, 500 B.R. at 251.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 255.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
100. See id. § 523(aX7).
101. Disciplinary Bd. v. Feingold (In re Feingold), 730 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013).
102. 730 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 1272.
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In August 2008, the debtor was disbarred from the practice of law in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania then obtained a judgment against the
debtor that assessed $44,889.92 for the costs and expenses associated
with the appointment of a conservator to oversee the winding-up of the
debtor's law practice and disciplinary proceedings against the debtor.
On the same day the Pennsylvania state court entered its judgment, the
debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The Disciplinary
Board filed a motion for relief from stay.'" The Disciplinary Board
argued that its attorney disciplinary proceedings, as a government
action, fell within the § 362(b)(4)' 0 exception to the automatic
stay.'06 The Disciplinary Board also requested relief from the stay
under the more general "for cause" provision found in § 362(dXl). 07
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied the motion.?0
In its ruling, the bankruptcy court
explained that if the judgment was "compensation for actual pecuniary
loss," then the debt would be dischargeable and the automatic stay
would apply.x' However, under § 523(a)(7), if the debt was a "fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit, and [was] not compensation for actual pecuniary loss," then it
would be non-dischargeable."10 The bankruptcy court found that the
judgment was entered to "reimburse the costs of litigation, rather than
to fine or penalize [the debtor].""' As a result, the debt was found to

be dischargeable. The bankruptcy court reasoned that because the debt
was dischargeable there was not sufficient cause for relief from the stay
and denied the Disciplinary Board's motion. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida reversed the bankruptcy
court's order." 2 In doing so, the district court held that the judgment
fell within the ambit of § 523(a)(7) as a non-dischargeable "fine, penalty,
or forfeiture" and not "compensation for actual pecuniary loss."n'

104. Id. at 1270.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 362(bX4) (2012) ("Mhe filing of a petition... does not operate as a
stay .. . [against] the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained
in an action or proceeding by [a] governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or
organization's police or regulatory power.").
106. In re Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1270.
107. Id. at 1271 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012)).
108. Id. at 1270.
109. Id. at 1271.
110. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX7)).
111. Id. (quoting bankruptcy court record).
112. Id. at 1272.
113. Id. at 1270-71 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 523(aX7)).
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Accordingly, the court decided that because the debt was non-dischargeable, sufficient cause existed and ordered that the Disciplinary Board be
granted relief from the stay."4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's holding
that the debt was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(7) but vacated the
district court's holding that the nondischargeability of the debt, in and
of itself, was sufficient cause to grant relief from the stay."5 In In re
Feingold, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with two issues: (1) whether
the judgment against the debtor was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(7)
and (2) whether sufficient cause existed to justify lifting the automatic
stay."6
In its decision, the court noted that nearly every other court addressing the issue of whether disciplinary costs and fees are a punitive
measure have determined that such assessments are properly viewed as
penalties."' In addition, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Kelly v. Robinson,"' which addressed
whether an order to pay restitution entered in a criminal proceeding
created a non-dischargeable debt."' In Kelly, the debtor attempted to
discharge criminal restitution that she was required to pay as part of
her probation. 20 The Supreme Court held that § 523(aX7) "preserves
from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of
Accordingly, the Supreme Court explained
a criminal sentence."'
that § 523(a)(7) creates a broad exception for all penal sanctions and
held that restitution was sufficiently penal in nature to fall under

114. Id.
115. Id. at 1278.
116. Id. at 1272.
117. Id. at 1273-74; see, e.g., Richmond v. N.H. Supreme Court Comm. on Profl
Conduct, 542 F.3d 913, 919-20 (1st Cir. 2008); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Smith (In re
Smith), 317 B.R. 302, 313 (Bankr. D. Md. 2004); Supreme Court v. Bertsche (In re
Bertsche), 261 B.R. 436, 438-39 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000); Carlson v. Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n (In re Carlson), 202 B.R. 946,951 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); State Bar
v. Doerr (In re Doerr), 185 B.R. 533, 537 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995); Fla. Bar v. Cillo (In re
Cro), 159 B.R. 340,343 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488,491 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1993); Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n v. Betts (In re Betts), 149
B.R. 891, 896 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n v.
Lewis (In re Lewis), 151 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. C.D. M. 1992); Bd. of Attorneys Profl
Responsibility v. Haberman (In re Haberman), 137 B.R. 292, 295-96 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1992)); see also State Bar v. Findley (In re Findley), 593 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[Attorney discipline costs imposed by the California State Bar Court ... are excepted
from discharge in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX7).").
118. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
119. In re Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1274 (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38).
120. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 39.
121. Id. at 50.
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§ 523(aX7). 122 In In re Feingold, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
the rationale of Kelly extended "to cost assessments arising out of
The court noted that attorney
attorney disciplinary proceedings.""
disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings share common goals
such as protecting the public and promoting the state's penal and
rehabilitative interests. 2
In addition, the court pointed out that
because cost assessments in attorney disciplinary proceedings are
discretionary, rather than mandatory, such assessments are penal in
nature. 2 ' In regard to the "not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss" element of § 523(a)(7),126 the court determined that "even where
a debt is intended to help defray the expense of government, it may not
be dischargeable if its primary purpose is penal."'
In the second half of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the non-dischargeability of the debt, standing alone,
was sufficient cause to grant relief from the stay.128 The court determined that it was not.'29 This was an issue of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit. However, the court pointed out that a "majority of
courts that have ruled on the question have concluded that a debt's
nondischargeability, standing alone, does not constitute 'cause' justifying
relief from the automatic stay."' The court agreed with these courts

122. Id. at 51, 53.
123. In re Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1274.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
127. In re Feingold,730 F.3d at 1275 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost
Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1995)).
128. Id. at 1276.
129. Id. at 1277-78.
130. Id. at 1277 (alterations in original) (citing In re Mu'min, 374 B.R. 149, 161-62
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) ("[Tihe automatic stay remains in effect, irrespective of a
determination of dischargeability.... [I]f the stay did not apply to a creditor who obtained
a favorable judgment under § 523, such creditor would get a head start on collection-precisely what the Bankruptcy Code was designed to prevent so that creditors could
share equally in the distribution of available assets."); In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342, 354
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) ("[PIrior to the entry of a discharge, even creditors holding
nondischargeable debts are prohibited by the automatic stay from resorting to judicial
proceedings to collect."); In re Weatherley, 169 B.R. 555, 561-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994)
("[Slimply because the Debtor's indebtedness to the IRS is nondischargeable does not
automatically compel relief from the stay in the IRS's favor. ... Of course, the IRS may
be entitled to relief from the automatic stay to proceed to levy against a taxpayer-debtor's
property where it presents evidence that it meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(d)(1) or 362(d)(2)."); In re Miller, 98 B.R. 110, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) ("The stay
is applicable to all claims, even nondischargeable and priority claims, unless excepted by
§ 362(b). . . .")).
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and held "that nondischargeability alone cannot supply the cause
contemplated by § 362(d)(1)."'as The court noted that dischargeability
is to be a factor, perhaps a weighty factor, in a bankruptcy court's forcause analysis but not a threshold question in determining cause under
§ 362(a)(1).13 2
Although the court in In re Feingold dealt with lawyer disciplinary
fines, the court's reasoning seems likely to apply to other professional
disciplinary assessments. For example, perhaps fines or assessments
brought against a doctor or an engineer by a state-mandated professional organization would also be non-dischargeable under § 523(aX7).

V. CONSUMER ISSUES
A.

Lien Stripping
Last year's article discussed the case of McNeal v. GMAC Mortgage,
LLC (In re McNeal) 3s in great detail.'
As you may recall, under
McNeal, a Chapter 7 debtor may "strip off' a second priority mortgage
lien on her home where the amount of the first lien exceeds the fair
market value of the home, leaving the junior lien holder wholly
unsecured."'
The Eleventh Circuit decided not to "publish" McNeal.'a This meant that the holding of McNeal was not binding, but
merely persuasive, upon the lower courts in the circuit.'3 1 This led to
confusion among the bankruptcy courts and lawyers on how to treat the
McNeal decision. Due to the confusion among the lower courts, the
Eleventh Circuit has decided to publish the McNeal decision. 3 8
Accordingly, McNeal's holding is binding upon all courts in the Eleventh
Circuit.
Going forward, the impact of McNeal remains unclear. The court's
holding in McNeal has been criticized by many commenters and has

131. In re Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1277.
132. See id. at 1278.
133. 477 F. App'x 562 (11th Cir. 2012).
134. Walker et. al., supra note 1, at 849.
135. Id. at 864.
136. See In re McNeal, 477 F. App'x 562 (N.D. Ga. 2012). Unpublished opinions of the
appellate courts are those decisions that are not available for citation as precedent because
the judges rendering the opinion deem the case as not having sufficient precedential value;
they therefore are not published in the Federal Reporter. 20 AM. JuR. 2D Courts § 38
(2014).
137. 20 AM. JR. 2D Courts § 38.
138. See McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 735 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2012).
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created a split of authority among the circuits."as The Eleventh Circuit
stands alone in its position, as the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
have refused to allow "strip off" in Chapter 7 cases.
Chapter 13 Plans
Under § 1327(a),140 the terms of a confirmed plan are binding upon
the "debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor
is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has
objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan." 4 ' Interestingly,
the language of § 1327(a) does not mention what effect, if any, confirmation has upon the Chapter 13 trustee.142 In Hope v. Acorn Financial,
Inc. (In re Acorn Financial,Inc.), the trustee's absence from the terms
of § 1327(a) was the substance of such a dispute."' The Eleventh
Circuit was asked to decide whether a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, which
gave a creditor a secured position, was binding upon a trustee, who,
while aware of defects in the creditor's secured position, failed to object
to the plan and actually recommended the plan for confirmation.1 44
In June 2010, Acorn Financial, Inc. (Acorn) financed the debtor's
purchase of a vehicle and retained a security interest in the vehicle. On
July 21, 2010, the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13.
Acorn did not perfect its security interest in the vehicle until July 27,
2010, six days after the filing of the bankruptcy case. As part of the
bankruptcy proceeding, Acorn filed a proof of claim on August 12, 2010.
The trustee's office contacted the local county tax commissioner and
discovered that Acorn had not perfected its security interest until July
27, 2010, six days after the filing of the bankruptcy case. Despite
knowledge of the defect in Acorn's security interest, the trustee did not
object to the debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan, which treated Acorn as
a secured creditor. In fact, the trustee recommended that the plan be
confirmed. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Georgia, noting the trustee's recommendation, confirmed the proposed
B.

139. Compare In re McNeal, 735 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2012); Palomar v. First Am.
Bank, 722 F.3d 992, 995-96 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a wholly unsecured second lien
cannot be stripped of in Chapter 7), and In re Talbert, 344 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a debtor may not strip off a lien securing an allowed claim under § 506(d)
even if the lien is wholly unsecured), with Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d
778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor is barred from stripping off a
wholly unsecured junior lien).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2012).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. 731 F.3d 1189 (2013).
144. Id. at 1191.
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plan on September 30, 2010, thereby vesting property of the estate in
the debtor. Roughly a week after confirmation of the plan, the trustee
filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the Acorn lien as a
preferential transfer.145
The trustee argued that, because § 1327(a) does not specifically
mention the trustee, the trustee is not bound by the terms of the plan
and can pursue post-confirmation avoidance actions that fall within the
§ 546(aX1XA) 4 6 two-year limitations period.'47 The trustee asserted
that if Congress had intended § 1327(a) to be binding upon the trustee,
it would have included the trustee in the statute."' In support of this
argument, the trustee pointed to several other provisions of Chapter 13,
5
such as § 1329(a)149 and § 1325(b)(1),"'
that specifically mention
trustees.51

The Eleventh Circuit did not agree. 5 2 The court held that in such
a situation, the trustee is bound by the terms of the confirmed plan and
may not pursue a post-confirmation avoidance action against the
However, the court was careful to point out that its
creditor.'
holding was a narrow one and was limited only to the facts before it.5 4
The court specifically declined to address a scenario where the trustee
only becomes aware of the defects in the creditor's security interest after
confirmation.xs5
VI. CHAPTER 11
In Crumpton v. Stephens (In re Northlake Foods, Inc.),"' the Chapter 11 trustee sought to recover, as a fraudulent transfer, a dividend
paid to a shareholder of the debtor corporation at a time when the
debtor was insolvent. As part of a shareholder agreement, Northlake
Goods, Inc. (Northlake) agreed to pay its shareholders a dividend at
least equal to the amount of each shareholder's individual tax liability

145. Id. at 1191, 1192.

146. 11 U.S.C. § 546(aX1XA) (2012).
147. Acorn Fin., Inc., 731 F.3d at 1192.
148. Id.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2012) (permitting plan modification "upon request of the
debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim").
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(bX1) (2012) (listing the trustee as a party who can object to the
confirmation of a plan).
151. In re Acorn Fin., Inc., 731 F.3d at 1191, 1192, 1193.
152. Id. at 1196.
153. Id. at 1195.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 715 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2013).
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if the corporation's income ever became taxable to the shareholders.'
In 2005, Northlake designated itself an S corporation' on its federal
tax return. This meant that the income tax liability of Northlake would
now "pass through" to the individual shareholders. In 2006, pursuant
to its obligation under the shareholder agreement, Northlake paid
Richard Stephens a dividend of $94,429, an amount equal to Stephens's
tax liability resulting from Northlake's designation as an S corporation.159
In 2008, Northlake filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and a Chapter 11
trustee was appointed. In 2010, the trustee filed a complaint in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida,
claiming that the 2006 payment to Stephens was a fraudulent transfer
subject to avoidance (under §§ 544160 and 548161) and recovery to the
estate (under §§ 550162 and 5511es).16
The trustee argued that the
2006 payment to Stephens was a fraudulent transfer because (1) "[A]t
the time of the transfer Northlake was insolvent or became insolvent as
a result of the transfer," and (2) "Northlake did not receive reasonably
equivalent value" for the transfer. 6 5 The bankruptcy court granted
Stephens's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, finding, based on the
pleadings, that Northlake had received a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the payment to Stephens. The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida affirmed, and the trustee appealed.166
A fraudulent transfer occurs when: (1) a debtor is insolvent at the time
of the transfer or becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer; (2) the
debtor receives less than a reasonably equivalent value for the transfer;

157. Id. at 1253, 1254.
158. As a C corporation, the corporate entity is taxed based on the amount of income
generated by the corporation. I.R.C. § 11(a) (2012). Also, shareholders in a C corporation
must pay individual income taxes on any dividend paid to them by the corporation. I.R.C.
§ 301(c)(1) (2012). Thus, income earned by a C corporation is taxed twice. Unlike a C
corporation, which is required to pay taxes on the income it earns, an S corporation is not
taxed at the corporate level. See generally I.R.C. § 1366 (2012). Instead, the tax liability
owed by the S corporation "passes through" to its shareholders, who pay the tax liability
in proportion to each shareholder's pro-rata share of the S corporation. Id. Thus, unlike
a C corporation, an S corporation avoids double taxation on dividends because Scorporation income is only taxed once-at the shareholder level.
159. In re Northlake Foods, Inc., 715 F.3d at 1253-54.
160. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
164. In re Northlake Foods, Inc., 715 F.3d at 1254.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1254-55.
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and (3) the transfer was made on or within two years before the filing
of the petition.'67 On appeal, neither party disputed that Northlake
was insolvent at the time of the transfer or that the transfer was made
on or within two years of the petition date.16 Therefore, the only issue
before the court was whether Northlake received a reasonably equivalent
value for the transfer."
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit explained that avoiding transfers
that are unsupported by reasonably equivalent value helps preserve the
value of the bankruptcy estate."o As a result, creditors are protected
from the estate's decline in value.'' A debtor receives a reasonably
equivalent value when the transfer confers an economic benefit upon the
debtor. 172 When a transfer provides an economic benefit, "the debtor's
net worth has been preserved, and the interests of the creditors will not
have been injured by the transfer."77 With that standard in mind, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court and held that Northlake
received a reasonably equivalent value for the 2006 payment to
Stephens.' 74
The court explained that Northlake had benefited from the shareholder agreement because it secured shareholder consent for Northlake to
shift to an S corporation."'7 In addition, the shareholder agreement
freed up cash that Northlake would have otherwise needed to pay
corporate taxes. 7 6 Even though Northlake was required to reimburse
its shareholders for taxes paid under the agreement, it was not required
to satisfy that obligation until a year after the shareholders had incurred
Northlake's tax liability, which provided Northlake with the added
benefit of time. 17 Because Northlake benefited economically from the
shareholder agreement, the court determined that it had received a
reasonably equivalent value in its payments to Stephens.'

167. Id. at 1256 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)).
168. Id. at 1255.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1256.
173. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. of Tenn. v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d
725, 727 (11th Cir. 1990)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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CONCLUSION

It is difficult to point to any noticeable trends or common threads
among this year's cases. However, the year set the stage for certain
anticipated developments. In particular, questions concerning Chapter
7 lien stripping, as addressed in Part V.A. of this Article, may be
answered in 2014. One other item worthy of note in 2014 will be the
Supreme Court's decision in the case of Executive Benefits Insurance
Agency v. Arkison,'7 9 which concerns the issue of (1) whether Article
III permits the exercise of judicial power of the bankruptcy court based
on litigant consent, and (2) whether a bankruptcy judge may submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a
district court in a "core proceeding." 80

179. 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).
180. Id. at 565.

